Background Germany has been identified as one of a few high income countries
What is already known?
Germany has been identified as one of a few high income countries that attempted to counter a strong FCTC, yet the tobacco industry's efforts to influence Germany's position have yet to be examined in detail.
What this study adds?
Drawing on tobacco industry documents and other data, this paper shows that Germany played a crucial role in the tobacco industry's efforts to undermine the FCTC. Germany's stance was based on argumentation developed by the industry and in some instances appears to have been directly influenced by the industry.
The German position consistently served to protect the interests of the tobacco industry and mobilised other negotiating parties in the industry's fight against a strong FCTC. The study also provides further evidence of the very close links between the tobacco industry and the German government. The convention that finally emerged from this protracted process has been widely hailed as successful in terms of content and its rapid and extensive ratification with 172 states having become party to the convention by January 2011. Concern has nevertheless been expressed about inter alia the failure to clarify the FCTC's relationship with trade agreements, its comparatively modest provisions when set against more optimistic initial ambitions, and the non-binding and unenforceable nature of many of its provisions. [1, 2, 3] While the strengths of the FCTC have been attributed to the leadership of developing countries, such weaknesses have been explained via intense pressure from a few high income countries, including Germany, that have enjoyed historically close links with tobacco companies. [3, 4, 5] Germany's apparent approach to the FCTC is consistent with its weak tobacco control policies [6, 7, 8] and repeated opposition to European Union (EU) tobacco control legislation. [9] This stance has been recently explained via a complex interplay of factors [10] including Germany's Nazi heritage, isolation from English speaking scientific and policy networks, reliance on industry self-regulation and long standing tobacco industry influence over science [11, 12, 13] and policy. [14, 15, 16] [18, 19, 20] and targeted national strategies [5, 21] to counter the FCTC. Recent literature has identified Germany as part of the "triumvirate of nations" [5] (Germany, Japan, United States) or the "big four" [22] (including China) that attempted to counter a strong convention. But to date, no detailed analysis of industry efforts to influence Germany's position or the extent to which Germany's position reflected such efforts has been undertaken. This paper therefore offers the first detailed account of tobacco industry attempts to influence the German government's position and in turn, use this position to undermine the FCTC. It further explores the significant role Germany played during the FCTC negotiations. Following such investigations both PM and BAT rapidly identified Germany as a key country willing to raise concerns about and oppose a strong FCTC. [36, 30, 37] Regarded as a "big player" [38] with the capacity to act, Germany became a priority for industry lobbying efforts [38] and both PM and BAT subsequently contacted German delegates in seeking to assess and influence Germany's position on the FCTC. [30, 38] Germany's potential significance to the industry was enhanced by its representation on the WHO Executive Board [39] and the Working Group [40] tasked with producing the draft convention during two meetings in October 1999 and March 2000 (Box 2).
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Germany, the ISO and WHO -gaining access to the negotiations
The tobacco industry also gathered information via its well established links with the [43] .
DIN also had tobacco company employees serving on its own committee on tobacco smoke. [44] In early 1999 the WHO sought membership of ISO/TC126 [45] and following discussion among both ISO/TC126 members [46, 47, 48] and tobacco companies, [45] in October 1999 WHO seems to have been accepted as a Category B member, [47] "in practice essentially as an observer… [unable to] vote, make any comments or statement." [49, 45] A 2001 BAT Germany analysis of the latter suggests a close relationship between industry representatives and German government officials: "It is no problem at all to have meetings with the civil servants in charge and exchange views and documents." [33] This document also indicates that the industry welcomed the 2001 change in federal health minister from Andrea Fischer to Ulla Schmidt. The convention was "a top priority" for the former while the latter was not expected to "put much pressure on this initiative". [33] Lobbying to influence Germany's position
In June 1999, Simon Millson, BAT manager responsible for FCTC issues, suggested
targeting key countries like Germany rather than approaching multiple countries, in a "more sniper, less scatter gun" approach. [38] The VdC played a crucial role in such efforts within Germany, and BAT documents suggest that the VdC's lobbying activities were effective, [62] for example, acknowledging the VdC's success in communicating the company position to the German Government. [63] Creating and utilising intra-governmental conflicts
Internationally, the industry sought to create and encourage controversy between government ministries. BAT repeatedly emphasised that "Health Ministers (and
Governments) must be won over or brought under control by Finance and Trade
Ministers" [64] and sought the latter's participation in FCTC negotiations [65] [74, 53] and that "[t]he German delegation… was silent." [74] Pauling later reported that while the FHM had refused to consult with the industry on the FCTC, other ministries pressed for such a meeting, [72] which documents suggest subsequently took place. [33, 75] 
Securing allies
Documents suggest that BAT successfully involved business associations, front groups and other organisations in its lobbying. [76, 77] Five German business associations outside the tobacco sector made submissions to the WHO's public hearings in October 2000, [78] advancing standard tobacco industry arguments [79, 80] and making their submissions available to the VdC before the hearings. [79, 80] A 2001 BAT analysis of Germany's FCTC position suggests that cooperation between allies, described as the "the whole tobacco family" worked well. 
Influencing Germany's argumentation and using Germany to advance industry arguments
The documents suggest both that the industry helped frame the German government's arguments against the FCTC and that Germany, in turn, played an important role in advancing industry arguments against the FCTC.
Arguing for a flexible and broad based convention
Using descriptors "broad" [82] and "flexible" [83] as euphemisms for a convention that did not contain binding obligations was a core industry strategy that aimed at securing a "broad convention." [65, 84, 85, 86] Japan's role in arguing for a broad and flexible convention as a result of industry lobbying has been well documented. [5] Germany also appears to have been sympathetic to such an approach from the outset [83] and in November 1999, Millson wrote that the:
"convention as being proposed by the WHO could contain some serious threats and concerns for the long term viability of the industry… We must therefore ensure that the convention and associated protocols are broad based. This view is shared by countries such as Germany, US, China, Japan…" [82] According to documents, Germany consistently supported a "flexible and broad convention" [63, 77, 87, 88] and a " more general, political document, without specifics." [89] The industry reported that Germany argued, at the second Working Group meeting, that "as many member states as possible should be able to agree to the principles of the FC [framework convention]", asserting that "flexibility in the text of the FC is a condition to success [sic] ." [90, 91] Pushing for economic impact assessment of the treaty
In 1999, Millson suggested using economic impact assessment, including assessment of the impact on jobs within tobacco agriculture, to delay approval of the FCTC and allow time to develop "other more substantial arguments". [92] Millson suggested that this delay should be "proposed by a Latin American country (Brazil, Chile, Argentina) and seconded by a western country (say Germany, Japan)". [92] The documents suggest that the German delegation played an important role in outlining economic arguments against the FCTC, adding economics and labour markets to the agenda for the first Working Group, [93] and stressing possible negative economic consequences of tobacco control [94] and the need for an economic impact study at the second Working Group meeting. [63, 95] Simultaneously, BAT had been pushing for economic impact assessment of key policies in Europe as it saw this, along with risk assessment, as a means of preventing the implementation of tobacco control measures. [96, 97] Arguing that "[a] total advertising ban would also be unconstitutional" [98] More specific arguments were developed against key elements of the proposed convention. BAT planned to audit protections for freedom of speech in national constitutions to demonstrate "the difficulty with introducing bans on advertising" [64] and such an audit was later cited by the International Advertising Association,[99] a tobacco industry "coalition partner", [65] at the WHO's public hearing. It claimed that in a study of 50 constitutions, freedom of expression was guaranteed in all. [100] Yet a copy of the study shows that "of all constitutions that were examined, only one -Sweden -protected commercial speech". [99] In 2000 the German Advertising Federation (Zentralverband der deutschen Werbewirtschaft of which the VdC was member) claimed, with regard to the FCTC, that a total advertising ban would be unconstitutional. [98] Germany was subsequently prominent in its opposition to comprehensive bans on tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship as being "unconstitutional", [101, 102] [58] confirmed Germany's role in confining the mandate to areas in which the EU had already enacted legislation [112] and the VdC in turn claimed that Germany's position was a direct result of industry lobbying with Pauling stating: "Germany has been a key country in defining the scope of the EU mandate… Until now, our government refuses to grant more competences to the EU on grounds like taxation, subsidies and fraud. We are working hard with all of our allies to strengthen this position." [33] Although the mandates were not made public (Box 3) and Germany's role in securing or preventing any change is unknown, there is evidence that other EU member states and the public health community were exasperated with Germany's negative influence. [114, 115] Using the German position to influence beyond the EU
The tobacco industry perceived Germany as having a "constructive position" and a "stabilising effect" on other countries, [63] encouraging the creation of coalitions [86] and "the sharing of ideas between like-minded countries" that opposed the FCTC. [116] A memo from 20 October 1999 by Millson to Edgar Cordero, a BAT corporate affairs employee in Central America, shows that BAT attempted to use Germany's position to influence Central American governments. [117] Millson sent Cordero information prepared by the VdC "regarding the position the German Government will adopt" at the first Working Group, and suggested that this might be "useful information to pass to the delegates [of some Central American governments] attending the meeting as it clearly states that the German Government has serious reservations about the FCTC". [117] In a letter to the VdC member companies during the first Working Group meeting, Pauling reported "strong resistance" of Latin and Central American countries to the FCTC and noted that these countries "are insisting that demands concerning economic interests should lie outside the WHO's competence". [112] 
DISCUSSION
Our findings suggest that the tobacco industry successfully influenced the German government's position, most notably by reducing the power of the FHM, and subsequently used the German government's position in its global efforts to undermine the FCTC.
The Chancellery appears to have had, in some instances, closer links to the industry than to the FHM, seemingly enabling the VdC to obtain detailed information on and shape the government's position more effectively than the isolated FHM. The creation of intra-governmental conflicts based on alleged conflicts between health aims and economic goals was devised as a strategy to be used globally [118] but appears to have been particularly successful in Germany. While the industry took advantage of divisions between the FHM and economically orientated ministries, the documents suggest that it also manipulated the conflict to foster critics and to silence FCTC supporters within the German government.
The VdC and DIN also provided the tobacco industry, through ISO, with access to formal FCTC negotiations. Evidence described in this paper shows that the tobacco industry gained direct access to the negotiations through ISO with Adams, a former employee of Imperial Tobacco, participating in Working Group and INB meetings. This is significant given WHO's dual determination to exclude the tobacco industry from FCTC negotiations and enhance civil society participation in the process. [119] The industry's determination to exploit its links with ISO demonstrates how easily legitimate civil society groups can also provide corporations with points of access to decision making. This exploitation of civil society groups, along with the industry's use of other business associations and front groups highlights the scale of the challenge outlined in article 5.3 of the FCTC calling upon parties to protect their public health policies from tobacco industry interference.
Our study also highlights the persistent value to tobacco companies of arguments that might be regarded as having been effectively discredited. Notwithstanding the World Bank's demonstration of neutral or even positive effects of tobacco control measures on the economy, [120, 121] the documents report that the German delegation consistently voiced concerns about the FCTC's alleged negative economic consequences. In part this may be attributable to the industry's longstanding influence in Germany which has led to an exaggerated view of the significance of tobacco for Germany's economy. [10] Similarly, constitutional arguments against tobacco control measures have long been employed by the industry in Germany, [10, 16] and were reiterated to prevent binding provisions for advertising bans in the FCTC. While the tobacco industry commissioned legal reports to show that advertising bans would be unconstitutional in Germany [16] and advanced these arguments among German politicians and the public, the issue has been strongly contested amongst experts. Although the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany has not yet ruled on the constitutionality of banning tobacco advertising, it has given a strong indication that advertising bans may well be constitutional [122] and a recent legal analysis [122] concludes that a comprehensive tobacco advertising ban would be compatible with the German constitution. The industry's ability to successfully use arguments in Germany that have been dismissed elsewhere may be due to its isolation from English speaking scientific policy networks, [10] which raises issues about how this information might be better disseminated to non-English speaking countries.
According to a typology [123] used in a review [124] of the negotiation of previous international framework conventions conducted for the tobacco industry, "veto states" or, given the difficulty of preventing conventions once negotiations are underway, "agenda weakening states" can be of immense strategic value. [124, 123] The documents presented above demonstrate how Germany was targeted for and played such a role within FCTC negotiations. Its close links with the tobacco industry, established resistance to tobacco control measures, economic and political power within international relations and the EU, and prominent roles within the FCTC process all marked Germany as a state that could contribute to efforts to stop, weaken or undermine the negotiations. Indeed Germany itself finally agreed to, and subsequently signed and ratified the convention only when broad exceptions were included in Article 13 of the final FCTC text that allowed countries to implement bans on tobacco advertising, promotion, and sponsorship in accordance with their constitution or constitutional principles and decline bans for such reasons.
Limitations
It is important to note the study's limitations. Although we attempted to triangulate and validate the evidence found, minutes of the treaty negotiations are not made publicly available online and could not therefore be analysed. The description of events is therefore mainly based on tobacco industry documents and thus largely represents the industry's perceptions of outcomes. In particular, a causal relationship between industry activities and the German government's position and action is hard to determine in part because it can be difficult to differentiate between the impact of tobacco industry activities described here and the effects of Germany's longstanding opposition to stringent tobacco control. It is noteworthy, however, that Germany's attitude to tobacco control generally also reflects decades of industry influence. [10, 14, 15, 16] The industry clearly found an ally in Germany and the two often took a shared approach, for example in the desire for a "broad" convention.
This resembles Japan's role in negotiating optional language in the FCTC text. [5] The extremely close links between the German government and the tobacco industry are striking and most likely played a key part in shaping Germany's position. Indeed this paper provides an illustration of the ease with which the industry operates in Germany.
Conclusion
The extent to which Germany's participation in efforts to undermine the FCTC is directly attributable to industry influence is less significant than the fact that Germany consistently served to protect the industry's interests and to influence and constrain other countries' positions on the FCTC. The German government has thereby contributed significantly to attempts to weaken an international treaty aimed at reducing the 5 to 6 million global deaths that occur each year from tobacco use. [125] This is almost identical to Germany's efforts to constrain and delay EU tobacco control policy. [9] The efforts of Germany and like-minded countries such as Japan, [5] China and the United States [22] constitute an abnegation of international responsibility, and a reminder of the ongoing challenges in ensuring that powerful vested interests do not undermine crucial initiatives in global health.
